Abstract-To meet the needs in low-bandwidth communication, low-storage and less computation environments, a new technique is introduced to construct short signature in the standard model. The new short signature scheme is constructed based on the bilinear pairing and has short public parameters. In addition, the size of the signature achieves 160 bits. Under the nExponent Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem(n-CDH), the new scheme is provable security. Finally, we also give the application of the new scheme by constructing the short identity-based signature and threshold signatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Short signature schemes are needed in environments with space and bandwidth constraints. There are going to be a lot of devices exchanging messages with each other in these environments, e.g., PDAs, cell phones, RFID chips, sensor networks and vehicle-2-vehicle communications [1, 2] . For these systems to work properly, messages must carry some form of authentication, but the system requirements on the authentication are particularly demanding.
A. Related works
Short signature is an active research area. As mentioned in [3, 4] , there are two paradigms of shortening signatures at present.
⋅ Shorten the total length of a signature and the corresponding message. In such schemes [5, 6] , one encodes a part of the messageinto the signature thus shortening the total length of themessage-signature pair.
For long messages, one can then achieve aDSA signature overhead of length of 160 bits.
⋅ Shorten the signature directly. This technique is
to shorten the signature directly while preserving the same level of security. Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [7] used a totally new approach to design such short digital signatures in 2001. Their scheme is based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption on elliptic curves with low embedding degree. A number of desirable schemes were proposed at present.
Currently, provable security is the basic requirement for the public key cryptosystem. The provably secure short signature schemes are based on two security model. One is the random oracles model. The other is standard model. Most of practical efficient schemes are provable secure in the random oracles model. Random oracle model is a formal model at present, where a hash function is considered as a blackbox that contains a random function. However, many results have shown that security in the random oracle model does not imply the security in the real world. Security in the standard model usually provides a higher security level than security in the random oracle model. Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin [8] firstly proposed practical secure signature schemes under the strong RSA assumption in the standard model. In 2004, Boneh and Boyen [9] proposed a short signature scheme from bilinear groups which is secure under the Strong DiffieHellman assumption without using random oracles. Later, Zhang F. et a [4] , Wei and Yuen [10] also proposed some short signature schemes in the standard model. However, it is also true that schemes providing security in the random oracle model are usually more efficient than schemes secure in the standard model. Table 1 gives a summary of signature size of the different schemes.
In Table 1 , RO and SM denote the random oracle model and standard model respectively. Size is the signature size.
B. Related works
We construct a new short signature in the standard model from the bilinear pairing. The size of new signature achieves 160 bits, which is shorter than others at present. The security of our scheme depends on the n-CDH assumption. Another contribution is the applications of new scheme. We construct the short identity-based signature and threshold signatures, by the same technique, thus testing the applicability of our scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Pairing G and 1 G are cyclic groups of order N. A bilinear map e is a map 
B. Hardness Assumption
Security of our scheme will be reduced to the hardness of the n-CDH problem in the group. We briefly recall the definition of the n-CDH problem:
Definition 1 (n-Exponent Computational DiffieHellman Problem) Given a group G of prime order p with generator g and elements g
, where α is selected uniformly at random from p Z and n ≥ 1, the n-CDH problem in G is to compute
Note that it was shown in [11] that n-CDH problem is equivalent to CDH problem for n=1.
Definition 2
We say that the (t, ε ) n-CDH assumption holds in a group G, if no adversary running in time at most t can solve the n-CDH problem in G with probability at least ε .
C. Security Definition
A signature scheme is made up of three algorithms, KeyGen, Sign, and Verify, for generating keys, signing, and verifying signatures, respectively.
The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , which is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
Setup The challenger runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public key PK and a private key SK. 
We will use a weaker notion of security which we call existential unforgeability under a weak chosen message attack. Here we require that the adversary submit all signature queries before seeing the public key. This notion is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
Query 
The private key is
Note: We omit the public keys corresponding to 1 , , n α α , 1 , , n β β since they are not used at the phase of Verify. Sign Message is represented as bit-strings of length n. Let 
B. New Construction
KeyGen Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a random generator of G.
Then .
The public key is
Sign Message is represented as bit-strings of length n. Let 
C. Efficiency
The size of our initial scheme achieves 2 1 | | G which is similar with the previous schemes in the standard model. But our new scheme has a signature of 160 bits. It is the shortest signature in the standard model at present. Table  2 gives the comprehensive comparison between our signature scheme and other schemes. We assume that all these short signature schemes use the GDH group which is derived from the curve Table 2 , we denote by e a computation of the pairing.
D. Security Proof
We only give a proof of the security of our second scheme since the first one can be proved by the similar method.
Theorem If n-CDH assumption holds, then our scheme is secure.
Proof: Assume that there is an adversary A which breaks the proposed scheme with advantage ε , we then show how to build an adversary B that solves the decisional n-CDH problem with advantage 
IV. APPLICATIONS

A. Identity-based Signature
In this section, based on the our previous signatures, we give an identity based signature scheme in the standard model. .
Setup
The public key is Efficiency : The well known identity-based signature in the standard model is issued by Paterson [19] . But it's signature size is 480 bits. The size of our scheme achieves 320 bits.
Security Analysis
The proof can be obtained from the previous proof.
B. Threshold Signature
In this paper, we also focus on the short threshold signature. To the best of our knowledge, very few works have dealt with this problem recently. A (t, n) threshold signature is to distribute a secret key and signature generation among n parties in order to remove single point of failure. The goal is to allow any subset of t or more parties to jointly produce a signature while preserving security of the system even in the presence of an active adversary up to t-1 parties. Threshold signature plays an important role not only in cryptographic literature but also in practice. Table 3 gives a summary of threshold signature size of the different schemes.
First Construction
Based on the initial construction, we give a new short threshold signature as follows:
Then And the private key for each signer
Partial Signing Message is represented as bitstrings of length n. Let Let Ω denote the set of validate users. Then the signature is reconstructed as 1 2 ( , )
where i L is Lagrange coefficient. 
Main Construction
Based on the above construction, we give a new short threshold signature as follows:
KeyGen Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a random generator of G. Pick 
The public key is Efficiency In our first scheme, both the partial signature size and the threshold signature size achieve 320 bits. But in our new scheme, these sizes achieve 160 bits, which is the shortest signature in the standard model at present. In addition, the pairing ( 0 1 , i i y y ) and ( 0 1 ,
are precomputed. Hence, there is only one pairing computation in the verifying stage. Table 4 gives the comprehensive comparison between our signature scheme and other schemes. We assume that all these short signature schemes use the GDH group which is derived from the curve 163 
3
E F defined by the equation 2 3 1 y x x = − + . This group provides 1551-bit discrete log security.
Note: In Table 4 , we denote by e a computation of the pairing.
Security Analysis
A threshold signature scheme is secure if it has the properties of unforgeability and robustness. The proposed threshold signature has the property of robustness. In fact, the threshold signature is reconstructed from at least t partial signatures. The designated player first verifies all the partial signatures and then chooses the valid ones to reconstruct a threshold signature. Even if having corrupted up to t-1 signers, the adversary still cannot produce a valid threshold signature since there is no way to get the t-th valid partial signature.
In order to prove the property of unforgeability of the scheme, we use the method given by R.Gennaro et al. [23] , which indicates that a threshold signature is unforgeable if the underlying signature is secure and the threshold signature is simulatable. A threshold signature scheme is simulatable if the following properties hold:
(1) The private key generation and distribution protocol is simulatable, that is, there is a simulator to simulate the view of the adversary on the execution.
(2) The threshold signature generation protocol is simulatable. That is, there exists a simulator to simulate the view of the adversary on the execution of threshold signature generation.
The private key generation and distribution protocol in our scheme is only a variant of our first scheme. So we only prove that the threshold signature generation protocol is simulatable. We assume that the adversary has corrupted up to t-1 signers Hence we can obtain the following Lemma. Lemma The proposed threshold signature is simulatable.
Hence we can obtain the following theorem. Theorem If n-CDH assumption holds, then our scheme is secure.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a short signature scheme which is more efficient than other short signature schemes proposed so far. Based on the n-CDH problem, we provide a rigorous proof of security for our scheme in the standard model. Finally, we give the application of the proposed scheme by constructing the short identity-based signature and threshold signature.
